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VERTICAL AGREEMENT AS HORIZONTAL RESTRAINT:
CERNUTO, INC. V. UNITED CABINET CORP.
In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,1 the Supreme
Court overruled prior case law 2 and held that a location restric-
tion imposed by a manufacturer on the distribution of its prod-
uct was not a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.3
Although courts 4 and commentators5 alike have struggled with
Sylvania's exact meaning and reach, its broad import is to require
that vertical restraints0 be governed generally 7 by a rule of
1433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding terri-
torial and choice-of-customer restrictions illegal per se).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4 See, e.g., Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429 (9th Cir.
1979) (territorial division of automobile markets); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593
F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (football draft); Cough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d
381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979) (newspaper advertising
access); Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978) (jobbers'
purchase of manufacturer marketing facilities); H & B Equip. Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978) (company store); Eastern Scientific
Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 833 (1978) (territorial restriction enforced by price restraints); General
Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978) (sales
territory).
5 See, e.g., Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Inte-
grating Social Coals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REv. 461, 463 n.12
(1979) (listing articles and notes on Sylvania); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Mar-
ket Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1979); Comment, A Proposed Rule of Reason Analysis for
Restrictions on Distribution, 47 FoRDHAm L. REv. 527 (1979); Comment, Vertical
Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
92 HAzv. L. REv. 1160 (1979).
6 "Vertical restraints" generally are restrictions limiting intrabrand competition
and are imposed by the manufacturer or other seller on buyers, distributors, or
retailers. The vertical restraint in Sylvania was a restriction on the location from
which Continental T.V., a retailer, could sell Sylvania products. Other vertical
restrictions include customer restrictions, limiting those to whom the products may
be resold; exclusive distributorships; grants of areas of primary responsibility; and
profit pass-over agreements. See generally ABA AwrrrmusT SECTION, VER cL
REsTRIcTioNs Lrrm& c INTRARAND CoME=oN 3-4, 20-25 (Monograph No. 2,
1977) [hereinafter cited as VERTcAL RE snucCToNs]; P. AREEDA, ANrIUST ANvALY-
sis 498-656 (2d ed. 1974); L. ScHwAnxz & J. FLYNN, AINTn-RUST AND REGULATORY
ALTER ,ATVs 999-1156 (5th ed. 1977).
7Vertical price fixing is one truly vertical restraint that remains subject to per
se treatment. See National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d
953 (2d Cir. 1978). But see Note, The Future of the Per Se Rule Against Vertical
Price Restrictions, 12 GA. L. REv. 612 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Future of the
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reason. 8 As a result, use of the rule of reason 9 has expanded, while
the importance of the rule of per se illegality has diminished, in
challenges to vertical restraints under section 1 of the Sherman Act.10
Countering this trend, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit narrowed Sylvania in Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp."- by giving a limited meaning to the term "vertical re-
Per Se Rule]. This continued use of a per se rule may be attributable to the courts'
conviction that price fixing, however and for whatever reason imposed, is wholly
without redeeming virtue. Although vertical price fixing may very well be endowed
with competitive attributes, see R. PosNEm, ANTrRUST LAw 148-49 (1976), respect
for the allocatory and regulatory functions of the price mechanism have induced
courts to refrain from even considering the reasonableness of vertical price fixing.
See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(price mechanism is the "'central nervous system of the economy'") (quoting
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)). Courts
likely believe also that the undesirable effects of vertical price fixing are not limited
to the reduction of intrabrand price competition. See White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 268 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Resale price main-
tenance is not only designed to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price
competition not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite as much
between that product and competing brands.") (emphasis in original).
The Court has suggested that other "applications of vertical restrictions might
justify per se prohibition." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 58 (1977).
8 For a recent exposition on the per se rule and the rule of reason, see National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978). Pro-
fessional Engineers advances an effects-oriented rule of reason, which seems to
narrow the discretionary rule articulated by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Although Sylvania relied upon
Chicago Board of Trade, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49 n.15 (1977), its view of the rule of reason is consistent with that of Professional
Engineers, 435 U.S. at 691 n.17.
Justice Stevens's opinion in Professional Engineers summarized the per se and
rule of reason methods of analysis:
There are .. . two complementary categories of antitrust analysis.
In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are
so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed
to establish their illegality-they are "illegal per se"-in the second cate-
gory are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by
analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
and the reasons why it was imposed.
Id. 692. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 7-10 (1979) (sui generis conduct unfamiliar to court not per se illegal);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (classic formulation of
per se rule); L. SuLuivAw, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AxqTiniusT, §§ 63-67 (1977).
O See, e.g., National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d
953, 960 (2d Cir. 1978) (except for price fixing, all vertical restraints governed by
rule of reason); Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572
F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (rule of reason applied to
resale-price maintenance); General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568
F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1978) (Sylvania intended to change more of the law than
that pertaining only to location clauses); Hoden Co. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
459 F. Supp. 1250 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (resale-price maintenance).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which provides in pertinent part: "Every contract,
combination . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared
to be illegal."
11595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
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straint." The Third Circuit ruled in Cernuto that a terminated
distributor could bring suit against its former supplier on the
theory that the latter's conduct was illegal per se. 12 The court,
reversing the district court's order of summary judgment for de-
fendants, held that a per se rule would apply if the plaintiff could
prove that its termination was the result of pressure from a com-
peting distributor seeking to escape the plaintiff's price competi-
tion. In reaching this conclusion, the court did not consider only
the vertical form of the restraint, but instead viewed the purported
conspiracy in terms of its horizontal purpose and impact on the
distributor level.13
This Comment will examine the validity, under Sylvania, of
the treatment of vertical arrangements with underlying horizontal
purposes as horizontal restraints. The application of this method
of analysis in the circumstances alleged in Cernuto-a simple agree-
ment between one manufacturer and one distributor to terminate
a competing distributor-will also be considered. If an ostensibly
vertical restraint is in fact prescribed by a competitor of the target,
the vertical aspects of the situation should not deter a court from
focusing on the horizontal purpose. Such a purpose does not char-
acterize the "vertical" restraints contemplated in Sylvania. Rather,
this type of restraint is more accurately termed "horizontal" and as
such is properly subject to a per se rule.
I. Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp.
Cernuto, Inc. is a Western Pennsylvania discount retailer of
supplies and appliances used in the construction and remodeling
of buildings. In 1974, a cabinet manufacturer, United Cabinet
Corporation, agreed to supply Cernuto for at least a two-year period
with kitchen cabinets for resale. Cernuto agreed to promote, dis-
play, and sell United's cabinets. Three months later, Robert L.
Lappin Company, sales representative for United, informed Cernuto
that United would no longer supply Cernuto with cabinets.' 4
Cernuto brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania 15 and asserted, inter alia,16 a viola-
12 Id. 170.
1 Id. 168.
14 Id. 165.
'5 Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1332, 1333 (W.D. Pa.
1978).
6 Plaintiff set forth five other counts predicated on alleged contract rights and
one count alleging unfair trade practices. Id. 1333.
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don of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 7 Cernuto alleged that United
terminated its distributorship because Famous Furnace & Supply
Company, a retail store selling United cabinets in the same market
as Cernuto, had complained to United that Cernuto "was selling
United products in Famous' territory" and that Cernuto "was a low
price volume dealer." 18
Defendants United and Lappin, moving for summary judg-
ment, argued that Cernuto had failed to assert that its termination
unreasonably restrained trade.19 Cernuto did not allege, and ap-
parently could not prove, that the termination had produced an
actual anticompetitive impact on the sale of cabinets in Western
Pennsylvania.20 Rather, its claim rested entirely on the illegality
per se of the combination among United, Lappin, and Famous.2'
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; 22
it ruled that Cernuto could not establish a per se violation because
the challenged termination did not involve boycotting, vertical price
fixing, or horizontal price fixing.
23
The court of appeals reversed. In an opinion for a unanimous
court, Judge Adams wrote:
Given the alleged anti-competitive and arguably hori-
zontal impact of United's decision, and given the price
orientation of the alleged conspiracy, we cannot say that a
per se violation of the Act may not be shown. If Cernuto
can prove at trial that United, Lappin and Famous con-
17 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
18448 F. Supp. at 1334. This Comment does not address specifically whether
price stabilization or elimination of "free riders" (discounters that take a free ride
on the promotion paid for by full-price retailers) are legal. See R. PoSNm,, supra
note 7, at 165-66. Price stabilization, even if resulting only from the elimination
of "free riders," is similar to a "naked" price restraint, see L. Su~wAN, supra note
8, at §§ 73-76, and cannot be excused by its "reasonableness." See United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Furthermore, elimination of dis-
counters is contrary to the social values of efficiency and low price, see Pitofsky,
The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 CoLum.
L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1978), and widespread elimination of discounters may seriously
impair the dynamics of the retail industry. Cf. Bliss, Schumpeter, the "Big" Dis-
turbance and Retailing, 39 SocrAL FORCES 72 (1960) (discounters are innovators
that provide "competition that matters"); McNair, Significant Trends and Develop-
ments in the Postwar Period, in CoMPETnavE DIsTRmUnoN IN A FREE ICH-LEVEL
EcoNomy AND ITs IMPLCAwTOmNS FOR THE UIivEns= 17, 18 (A. Smith ed. 1958)
(explanation of the classic "wheel of retail" theory-innovation brought to retailing
by discounters and others meets needs unfulfilled by established retailers; successful
innovators become established retailers, and process begins anew).
19 448 F. Supp. at 1334.
20 Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 1979).
21 Id. 166.
22 448 F. Supp. at 1337.
23 Id. 1335-36.
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spired to protect Famous from price competition by Cer-
nuto, and that United and Lappin terminated Cernuto at
Famous' request and in pursuit of a price related end,
then it can prevail on a price-fixing theory notwithstand-
ing its failure to show any impact on competition involving
kitchen cabinet sales in Western Pennsylvania.2
At trial, defendants could escape application of a* per se rule by
demonstrating either that United's decision was in fact its own, and
therefore essentially unilateral and vertical, or that their actions
were not motivated solely by price considerations. Alternatively,
they could escape section 1 of the Sherman Act altogether if Cernuto
failed to prove the existence of concerted action.
The relationship in Cernuto between a distributor and a man-
ufacturer is vertical in nature, and under Sylvania the general stand-
ard for judging such arrangements is the rule of reason. 25 Sylvania
itself, however, suggested certain exceptions to this rule. For ex-
ample, price fixing and resale-price maintenance, even if vertical in
form, remain illegal per se.26  Thus, Judge Adams could have in-
voked the per se rule on this theory alone.2 7  Instead, he approached
the restraint first in terms of its horizontal impact.28 By so doing, he
distinguished Sylvania, not only on the ground that Sylvania in-
volved only a nonprice vertical restraint, but also on the difference
in the purposes underlying the restraints in the two cases. Judge
Adams interpreted Sylvania to mandate a rule of reason only for
24 Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 1979).
25 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
26 Id. 51 n.18. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
(1966) (vertical price fixing illegal per se); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks
& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale-price maintenance). But see Eastern
Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (resale-price maintenance judged by rule of reason);
The Future of the Per Se Rule, supra note 7 (Sylvania may provide rationale for
not applying per se rule to vertical price fixing).
2 7 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)
(elimination of discounters to eliminate prices illegal per se); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (resale-price maintenance illegal per se);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (characterization of
conduct as price fixing and therefore illegal per se).
28 Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 167 n.15 (3d Cir.
1979) ("[A]Ithough we are confronted here with an apparently vertical conspiracy,
the principal impact of that conspiracy . . . is horizontal rather than vertical in
nature."). Judge Adams also found support for application of a per se rule in the
alleged object of the conspiracy, elimination of the discounter's price competition.
Id. 169. He hinted, however, that horizontal impact alone might be sufficient to
invoke the per se rule when, in discussing two nonprice cases, he suggested the
Third Circuit might there have accepted per se theories rejected by other circuits.
Id. That price fixing constitutes a per se violation, whether the restraint is vertical
or horizontal, is widely accepted. See note 26 supra & accompanying text.
[Vol. 12.8:622.
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restraints imposed unilaterally by a manufacturer on intrabrand
competition. 29 When the restraint, albeit vertical in form, resulted
in fact from pressure by a distributor upon a manufacturer, "the
desired impact is horizontal and on the dealer, not the manufac-
turer, level." 8 Such restraints with horizontal purposes fall out-
side Sylvania's scope and may be subject to a per se rule.3'
This Comment will now turn to a more detailed and critical
consideration of Judge Adams's treatment of Sylvania. Second, the
Comment will examine the theory and significance of characterizing
vertical arrangements as horizontal because of their horizontal pur-
pose and effect. The Comment will then confront what appears to
be a contrary approach in the Second Circuit 32 and, finally, will
explore the practical difficulties in applying Cernuto.
II. Sylvania, UNILATERAL DECISIONS, AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
In Sylvania,33 GTE Sylvania, a manufacturer of televisions,
terminated the distributorship of Continental T.V., a television
retailer, after the latter had violated Sylvania's restrictions on dis-
tribution locations. Sylvania had imposed these restrictions as
part of its marketing strategy to reverse declining sales and to im-
prove its competitive stance in the television manufacturing indus-
try.s4 Continental argued that Sylvania's territorial restrictions
were per se illegal under the rule of United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.3 5  The Court overturned Schwinn, rejected Con-
tinental's argument, and ruled that nonprice vertical restraints chal-
lenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act 36 were to be judged by
the rule of reason.37
In Cernuto Judge Adams reasoned that, unlike the restraint
in Sylvania, the restraint in Cernuto was not "unilateral": "When
a marketing decision, although ostensibly taken by a manufacturer,
is in fact the result of pressure from another customer, such a deci-
29 595 F.2d at 167.
80 Id. 168.
a' Id.
3 2 See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
33 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
34 Id. 37-39.
35 388 U.S. 365 (1967). "Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without
more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom
an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it."
1d& 379.
36 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See note 10 supra.
27 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
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sion must be scrutinized more closely than solely unilateral action
might be." 38 His distinction is based on "the law's traditional
tolerance of unilateral decisions on the part of a manufacturer," 39
which can be traced to the manufacturer's right, articulated in
United States v. Colgate & Co., 0 "freely to exercise his own inde-
pendent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." 41 Theo-
retically, a manufacturer acting unilaterally may pursue certain
goals, such as resale-price maintenance, that would be illegal per se
if not unilateral acts. 42  A manufacturer's reliance on the Colgate
doctrine, however, is limited to "mere announcement of his policy
and the simple refusal to deal."43 Once the manufacturer's re-
fusal to deal is tainted by duality of action, as manifested by the
existence of an agreement, whether express or implied,44 the doc-
trine is not applicable.
45
At first blush, distinguishing Sylvania on the onesidedness of
the action appears unpersuasive. Vertical restraints are usually
spelled out in a dealer's contract 46 and thus necessarily involve
agreement between manufacturers and distributors. In a sense,
therefore, all vertical restrictions, at least when there has been some
38 Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979).
39 Id. 167.
40250 U.S. 300 (1919).
411d. 307. The principle's roots can be traced even further to the common
law freedom of a trader to choose to whom he will sell. See 1 M. iNnrami,
TwEnry-FIvE YEARs oF ANnTuST 363 (1973). This freedom is reflected also in
the limitation of section 1 of the Sherman Act to actions by more than one party.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See note 10 supra.
42See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 148 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring). According to one court, however, the Colgate doctrine
is but "a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may pass even though the
facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this
day of complex business enterprise." George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960). See Comment, An Examination of
Doric Simplicity: The Criteria of the Decision to Cease Business Relations, 10 VLL.
L. REv. 117 (1964).
43 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
44FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922). See Turner,
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HAzv. L. REv. 655, 655-56 (1962).
45 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (illegal agree-
ment to maintain resale prices); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959) (illegal concerted refusal to deal); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (illegal exclusive arrangement); United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (illegal resale-price maintenance); FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (illegal resale-price maintenance);
United States v. A. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. 85 (1920) (illegal resale-price main-
tenance).
4 6A common example of restriction by contract is the franchise agreement.
VERscA. BEsTRCTIoNs, supra note 6, at 1.
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negotiation between the parties, are non-unilateral and cannot be
excused under the Colgate doctrine.
Judge Adams's approach is more plausible, though, if analysis
is focused on the decision to impose a restraint, rather than on the
agreement by which the restraint is imposed. A restraint is uni-
lateral if it represents the manufacturer's independent decision to
control its distributors in its own interest. Restraints imposed by
the manufacturer as a result of capitulation to dealer or other out-
side pressure are non-unilateral. The Cernuto approach implies
that only those restraints imposed unilaterally by a manufacturer,
that is, as a result of a manufacturer's decision alone, are "vertical
restraints."
This definition of vertical restraint is not inconsistent with
Sylvania or with the case law in other circuits. In Sylvania, the
business arrangement found to be a vertical restriction was a loca-
tion restraint imposed unilaterally by GTE as part of its marketing
strategy. No evidence suggested dealer pressure.4 7 When restraints
have been imposed by a manufacturer or supplier on its own initia-
tive-unilaterally-other courts have likewise accepted the restraint
as vertical.48 But in cases in which the restraint, although vertical
in form, was imposed non-unilaterally, the restraint has been con-
sidered horizontal.49 In United States v. Sealy, Inc.,50 for instance,
the Court treated a territorial restriction imposed by a trademark
licensor as a horizontal restraint. Sealy was in the business of li-
censing manufacturers to produce and sell Sealy brand-name mat-
tresses. In fact, however, Sealy was a joint venture of these very
47 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1977).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372-73
(1967), overruled on other grounds, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)
(vertical restrictions imposed solely by manufacturer); In re Nissan Antitrust Liti-
gation, 577 F.2d 910, 915 (5th Cir. 1978) (vertical restrictions are limitations
imposed by manufacturer); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577
F.2d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1978) (vertical restraints originate with manufacturer);
Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus. Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(impetus for vertical restriction must come from manufacturer); Evanston Motor
Co. v. Mid-Southern Toyota Distribs., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (pure vertical restraint). Cf. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126,
131 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978) ("'vertical' restraints,
i.e. combinations of persons at different levels of the market structure") (emphasis
added). See also B. Boni;, THE ANerimusT PAanox 288 (1978).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (cooperative
association of supermarket chains allocating territories and limiting resale); United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (joint venture allocating territories among
members and fixing prices); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
(1966) (manufacturer and dealers cooperating to secure and enforce restraints on
,dealers).
50 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
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licensees,51 which constituted Sealy's board of directors, the body
that had imposed the restriction. Finding that the restraints were
the creature of the licensees, rather than of Sealy, the Court held the
restraint horizontal. 2
The result in Sealy does not mandate the conclusion in Cernuto.
Sealy involved several manufacturer-licensees acting, through the
licensor they controlled, to restrain licensees. The conspiracy,
among parties at the same level, was directed at parties also at that
level-a typical horizontal scheme except for the involvement of
the licensor as the "instrumentality of the licensees." 53 In Cernuto,
on the other hand, only one alleged conspirator was on the same
level with the damaged retailer. Arguably, therefore, the con-
spiracy was not at one level, and the restraint should not be classed
as horizontal. 4 This distinction does not make sense: as long as
the impetus for a restraint comes from a competitor, a party at the
same level as the object of that restraint, it should be treated as
horizontal, whether the conspiracy is at that level, that is, among
competitors, or is between levels, for instance, involving a manufac-
turer and a retailer.
The argument that a restraint prescribed by a competitor takes
on a horizontal character and is not given the latitude accorded
vertical restraints was accepted by the Eighth Circuit in Quality
Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.55 In that case, Ford had bound
itself not to create another Lincoln automobile dealership in the
Minneapolis area without the consent of Prestige Lincoln-Mercury,
one of its dealers. Quality, which had been operating a Mercury
dealership in the area, alleged that its attempt to secure a Lincoln
dealership was blocked by Prestige under the Ford-Prestige agree-
ment. The court read Quality's section 1 complaint to allege "an
arrangement whereby a horizontal competitor . . . has a perpetual
veto power over all applications for Lincoln franchises in the Min-
51 Id. 353. The licensees owned substantially all of the Scaly stock. Id. 352.
52 Id. 354.
53 1&
54 For a more extensive discussion of this argument, see notes 102-23 infra &
accompanying text.
55 542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977). See
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d 54, 65 (2d Cir. 1977) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting) (applying Quality Mercury to case of dealer termination), aff'd en bane,
579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); American Motor Inns,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J.) (franchisee
veto power over grant of new franchises). Cf. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940) (licensing conditions for patented process not justified,
by patent monopoly when used for commercial development of licensees).
[Vol. 128:622
"VERTICAL" HORIZONTAL RESTRAINT
neapolis area." Il So construed, the court found that Quality's com-
plaint stated a proper claim for relief under the antitrust laws and
reversed the district court's dismissal on the pleadings.
The facts in Quality Mercury are analogous to those alleged in
Cernuto. In each, the violation charged was a manufacturer's re-
fusal to deal with a distributor, in form, at least, a vertical re-
straint. In addition, however, a competitor was claimed to have
instigated the restraint in both cases. The court in Quality Mer-
cury found the alleged agreement between Ford and Prestige ob-
jectionable because the contract granted "sole discretion to a hori-
zontal competitor as to the entry of another dealership in the
Minneapolis area." 57 Although vertical in appearance, the restric-
tion was used primarily to stifle competition on the distributor
level, and ultimate power was in the hands of the distributor. A
restraint caused by such an arrangement, the court held, may be
unreasonably anticompetitive and therefore may constitute a viola-
tion of the Sherman ActY8
Although the court stated that anticompetitive effect was the
justification for the outcome of the case,59 impact should not be
determinative. 0 The Supreme Court has adjured courts to avoid
"formalistic line drawing," 61 and the immediate effect of excluding
competitors is the same whether resulting from a unilateral deci-
sion by a manufacturer or from a veto by a competitor. Preferable
is a distinction according to purpose. Valid, procompetitive rea-
sons may justify a manufacturer's unilateral decision, despite some
anticompetitive effects, but when a competitor is the source of the
restraint, the purpose itself, which is directed horizontally, is likely
to be anticompetitive. At the least, Quality Mercury, like Sealy,
suggests that vertical form will not insulate a restraint with hori-
zontal purpose from scrutiny greater than that given unilateral
G6 Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
571d. 471 (emphasis in original).
58 Id. 471 & 471-72 n.6. Quality Mercury did not assert a per se violation,
id. 469 n.2; the court, in reversing the dismissal, found that the plaintiffs had
alleged a restraint unlawful under a rule of reason.
Quality Mercury was decided before the Court's decision in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), but that distinction does not affect
this Comment's analysis of the case.
59 542 F.2d at 471 & 471-72 n.6.
60 L. SuLi.ANr, supra note 8, at 195. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). Although impact should not be controlling,
anticompetitive effects may be relevant and may be inferred from anticompetitive
purposes: "purpose ... can stand as a surrogate for effects." L. SurlavAN, supra
note 8, at 195.
61 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
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vertical restraints. Moreover, it presages the reasoning in Cernuto
that a restriction with a horizontal purpose, though a vertical form,
should be treated as a horizontal restraint. The relevant purpose
is presumed to be that of the party prescribing the restraint. The
following section explores the relationship between a restraint's
origin and its likely purpose.
III. DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS: PosmiON AS A GUIDE TO PURPOSE
The Supreme Court's decision in Sylvania relied on the premise
that restraints imposed by a manufacturer on intrabrand competi-
tion may enhance interbrand competition by permitting the manu-
facturer to realize certain marketing efficiencies.62 These efficiencies
are achieved by the construction and exploitation of what are
known as marketing or distribution channels.68 Distribution chan-
nels have been variously described,64 but are essentially the means
by which the manufacturer gets its product, in the desired form, to
the consumer.65 A distribution channel is intended to enhance
the competitive position of the manufacturer's product relative to
the products of other manufacturers.
66
Much conflict can exist within a distribution channel.6 7 One
source of conflict is vertical, 68 conflict between the manufacturer's
"universal" goals-the improvement of its product's competitiveness
62 Id. 54-55.
63 See, e.g., P. CONVERSE, H. HUEGY, & R. MITCHELL, Er.~mNTs OF MARKETING
531-52 (7th ed. 1965); J. HEs~=r, MA, ETING 257-364 (1976); E. McCARTHY,
BASIC MA=Tm: A MANAGERrAL APPROACH 300-85 (5th ed. 1975).
64 See Davidson, Channels of Distribution--One Aspect of Marketing Strategy,
Busnruss HoRazoNs, Feb., 1961, at 84, reprinted in L. BOONE & J. JoHNsoNe,
MARKETING CHANNELS 3 (1973).
65 The choice of a particular channel is a strategic decision based upon con-
sideration of, inter alia, the marketing objective, the market environment, and the
manufacturer's resource pool. See M. BELL, MAMMTING CONCEPTS & STRATEGY
455-92 (1966).
66 The following discussion does not necessarily pertain to distributors, such as
wholesalers and jobbers, other than retailers in general. To the extent, however,
that they share the characteristics of retailers in general, the following discussion
is relevant in assessing their role in a distribution channel. The following discus-
sion also omits consideration of "dual distribution systems," in which vertically
integrated manufacturers function at the same level of distribution as their dis-
tributors. Manufacturer involvement in distribution may transform otherwise ver-
tical restraints into horizontal restraints. See VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS, supra note 6,
at 2 n.3 (listing cases).
67 See W. ALDERSON, DYNAmC MAmRrTN BEHAVIOR 239 (1965); Mallen,
Conflict and Cooperation in Marketing Channels, in THE MArmTNG CHANNEL 124
(B. Mallen ed. 1967); Stern & Gorman, Conflict in Distribution Channels: An Ex-
ploration, in L. STERN, DISTRMUTION CHANNELS: BEHAVIORAL DnRINSIONS 156
(1969).
68 See R. PALAmoVUNTAIN, TE PoLrmcs OF DISTRIBUTION 48 (1955).
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-and the subgoals of such distributors as retailers-pursuit of their
own conceptions of profit maximization or assertion of their inde-
pendence. 69 Retailers tend to consider themselves as independent
businessmen, rather than as mere agents distributing a manufac-
turer's product.7 0 Most retailers carry a large number of items
but only a relatively small inventory of any single item or product
line.7' A retailer's efforts are directed primarily toward obtaining
orders for all of its products rather than for any single item.72 The
simultaneous representation of various manufacturers in the same
store inherently reinforces the retailer's conception of itself as an
independent business. Due to the nature of its business, the
retailer's interests may even be adverse to those of the manufac-
turer "-
Vertical restraints, such as territorial restrictions, are designed
to control this vertical conflict,74 but they also control horizontal
conflict within the channel.75 Horizontal conflict arises between
components operating on the same level of distribution and pursu-
ing separate, independent subgoals.76 Among retailers, horizontal
conflict may assume the proportions of rivalry.
6 9 The model is borrowed from Williamson, supra note 5, at 955-56 & n.13.
70See Wittreich, Misunderstanding the Retailer, HAIv. Bus. REV., May-June,
1962, at 147.
71 See E. McCvAfGY, supra note 63, at 325.
72 See McVey, Are Channels of Distribution What the Textbooks Say?, J.
MARmKET , Jan., 1960, at 61, 64.
73 Consider, for example, a territorial restriction imposed by a manufacturer to
induce dealer services. Prior to the restraint the favored dealer faced intrabrand
competition. Afterwards, however, it has profits that would have been precluded
by intrabrand competition. (Pricing discretion is still constrained by interbrand
competition.) The dealer now has funds to invest in presale, point-of-sale, or
postsale services, for example, (1) services to differentiate the manufacturer's
product; (2) services such as a redecorated showroom to differentiate the dealer's
store and indirectly all products sold therein; or (3) services to differentiate the
products of other manufacturers. The dealer will invest the funds in the option
providing the greatest returns. That choice may not necessarily be the first option,
which would increase sales of the manufacturer's product. If the manufacturer is
concerned only with increasing output, option (2) may satisfactorily dovetail with
this goal. But if the manufacturer's goal is to increase its market share, that choice
will not serve its interests unless the dealer does not carry products of competing
manufacturers.
Cf. Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 602 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 232 (1979) (customer orientation of sugar brokers).
74 "[V]ertical territorial restraints may be used to increase perception of mutual
self-interest and to restrain conduct not in accord with it." Strasser, Vertical Terri-
torial Restraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977
D=xu L.J. 775, 787.
75 See VERTicAL REsTniCTiONs, supra note 6, at 4-5.
76 See R. PALouN o xN, supra note 68, at 24.
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Rivalry among retailers is not waged primarily on an intra-
brand or interbrand basis, but generally on an interstore basis. The
product is the store. Retailers compete as units composed of
bundles of goods and services in exploiting an appealing image or
a strategic geographical location. It's Macy's against Gimbel's, with
everything thrown into the fray, from consumer credit to plentiful
parking spaces to smartly dressed salespeople.7 7 An important
weapon in interstore rivalry is inventory, a broad, perhaps even
redundant, offering of products and styles.78 A diverse inventory is
particularly invaluable in an industry in which the crucial objective
is to bring the shopper in off the street so that he may be exposed
to the store's full range of offerings. By inducing a manufacturer
to refuse to deal, a retailer can strike a serious, if not irreparable,
blow against a rival.
Because a manufacturer's goals are aimed at increasing inter-
brand competition, that is, competition among manufacturers, the
purpose of a restraint on a distribution channel imposed unilaterally
by a manufacturer may be presumed to be procompetitive. As the
Court noted in Sylvania, vertical restraints may reduce intrabrand
competition, but they are most often intended to improve the
manufacturer's market position relative to that of competing manu-
facturers.79 A manufacturer can only rarely abuse its ability to
restrain intrabrand competition to realize objectives in the inter-
77 See J. HEsxETr, supra note 63, at 271-73, 279-80; P. McANALLY, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE DITunuvE TADE (1971); E. McCARTHY, supra note 63, at
319-20; Lozer & Kelley, The Retailing Mix: Planning and Management, J. RETA.L-
iNG, Spring, 1961, at 34; Martineau, The Personality of the Retail Store, HcAv. Bus.
REv., Jan.-Feb., 1958, at 47.
"The real or imagined differences that set products apart may be due to the
firm's reputation, its congenial and courteous sales personnel, an attractive brand
name, an appealing package or a convenient location." W. DAvISSON & J. RANLETr,
AN INTRODUCTiON To MiCROECONOMIC THEoRY 192-93 (1965), quoted in Mueller,
Antitrust & Economics: A Look at "Competition," 10 ST. Lotus U.L.J. 482, 494 n.59
(1966).
78 Most [retailers] regard their stock as the foundation of their business.
In Daniel DeFoe's language: "'tis the having a shop well filled with goods,
having good choice to sell, and selling reasonable, these are the things
that bring a trade, and the trade thus brought will stand by you, and
last."
P. McNALLY, supra note 77, at 58.
79 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977).
In fact, a distribution channel responsive to the manufacturer's interbrand strategy
may be viewed as a single economic unit, a distributive system competing with the
distributive systems of other manufacturers. See McCammon & Bates, The Emer-
gence and Growth of Contractually Integrated Channels in the American Economy,
in TnE MACRKETING CHANNEL 287 (B. Mallen ed. 1967). Seen in this light, vertical
restraints imposed on a distribution channel by a manufacturer involve only one
economic unit and perhaps may be said to fall outside the purview of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.
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brand market: 80 "It]he degree of intrabrand competition is wholly
independent of the level of interbrand competition confronting the
manufacturer. .. . [W]hen interbrand competition exists . . . it
provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market
power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different
brand of the same product." 81 The reasonableness of vertical re-
straints imposed unilaterally by manufacturers may therefore be
judged by balancing the procompetitive (interbrand) effects against
those that are anticompetitive (intrabrand).
8 2
Distributors' goals likewise relate to competition at the level
at which they operate-competition with each other. Horizontal
restraints are "naked restraints of trade with no purpose except
stifling of competition" 83 and will generally be subject to a per se
rule.s4 A supplier's involvement in a horizontal restraint does not
negate this presumption by adding a procompetitive intent. The
supplier participates merely as the "enforcement agent" 85 in fur-
thering the distributors' anticompetitive and horizontal purposes.
A refusal to deal, taken at the direction of a distributor, can have
the purpose and effect of reducing or eliminating intrabrand and
interstore competition without the countervailing benefit, presumed
to result from unilateral action by the manufacturer, of enhancing
interbrand competition. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Industries, Inc.,86 the Third Circuit explained, "[a]s we pointed
out in Cernuto, dealer inspired terminations may pose serious anti-
competitive risks not presented by a manufacturer's unilateral re-
fusal to deal." 87
8oSee R. BoiRt, supra note 48, at 297: "Basic economic theory tells us that
the manufacturer who imposes such restraints cannot intend to restrict output and
must... intend to create efficiency."
81 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
82 Compare United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal
restraint) and United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (horizontal re-
straint) with Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(vertical restraint) and United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 358-64 (1967)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-
89 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979) (rule of reason balances the
competitive and anticompetitive benefits of restraint); Pitofsky, supra note 18;
Comment, A Proposed Rule of Reason Analysis for Restrictions on Distribution, 47
FonnaArmv L. REv. 527 (1979).
83 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S." 253, 263 (1963).
84New entrants and weak firms may be candidates for exceptions to this general
rule. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319, 331 (1962) (excep-
tions to per se rules recognized for small companies attempting to compete with
larger companies and for failing companies attempting to remain in business).
85 Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 17 (1977).
86 [1979-2] Trade Cas. 162,790 (3d Cir. 1979).
87 Id. 78,582.
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Applying a vertical analysis to such restraints would produce
distorting results.8 8 Vertical analysis would permit defendants to
concoct as a defense allegedly offsetting interbrand competitive
effects. But these are essentially unintended effects. Efficiency,
even if it could be shown to result from a dealer-prescribed re-
straint, should not impede justice.89 Furthermore, vigorous inter-
brand competition will not likely be able to buffer diminished inter-
store competition, especially when competing products are sold side
by side in the same store.
In light of these realities, a court, faced with a restraint ostensi-
bly imposed by a manufacturer but in fact dictated by a distributor,
should apply a horizontal analysis. The affected competition, in-
terdealer and interstore competition, can then be the gauge for
judging the restraint. Once vertical analysis is deemed inappro-
priate, the presumption of offsetting procompetitive effects dis-
appears, and the court's inquiry is limited to the anticompetitive
effects in the restrained market.90 Arrangements, such as territorial
division, that would be tested under a rule of reason if analyzed as
a vertical restraint may therefore be subject to a per se rule when
their only vertical characteristic is their form.
IV. A GLOSS ON SUBSTANCE: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.
Cernuto advances an approach at odds with that taken by the
Second Circuit in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.91 Judge Adams
distinguished Oreck on its facts, 92 but the rift between the circuits
88 For discussion of a case applying vertical analysis to a dealer-prescribed
termination, see notes 91-137 infra & accompanying text.
89 Amidst the raging controversy about the goals of the antitrust laws, compare
R. BoRx, supra note 48, at 50-89; R. PosNER, supra note 7, at 8-22 and Elzinga, The
Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efliciency, What Else Counts?, 125
U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1977) with Bohling, supra note 5; Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. BEv. 1051 (1979) and Schwartz, "Justice" and
Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1076 (1979), at least
one safe proposition is that neither justice, social goals, nor economic or judicial
efficiency is well-served by post hoc rationalizations for objectionable behavior.
See also note 60 supra & accompanying text.
90 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-12 (1972) (judicial
scrutiny confined to restrained portion of economy); Schwartz, supra note 89, at
1080 ("[Wlhen 'effect on competition' is the criterion of legality, an adverse effect
in one market should suffice to condemn the transaction without exploring the pos-
sible pro-competitive impact in another market.") (footnote omitted).
91579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). See
also Comment, Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 Hnv. L. RPv. 1160 (1979) (applauding Oreck).
92 Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 169-70 (3d Cir. 1979).
Judge Adams also distinguished on its facts Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
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may not be so readily explained. As Judge Adams admitted, "we
are not convinced that this Court would necessarily have decided
... Oreck the same way had we been presented with the identical
factual configuration." 93
In Oreck, a distributor, Oreck, sued its supplier, Whirlpool,
and a competing distributor, Sears Roebuck & Co., because of
alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Whirlpool is
a manufacturer of, among other things, vacuum cleaners. Most of
its business was with Sears, which sold Whirlpool vacuum cleaners
under the "Kenmore" label. 94 In 1963, Whirlpool entered into an
agreement with Oreck making it the exclusive distributor of "Whirl-
pool" brand vacuum cleaners for a five-year period. The agree-
ment was extended after five years for another three. At the end of
this period, Whirlpool informed Oreck that it intended to allow the
sales agreement to expire and thereby to terminate Oreck's exclu-
sive distributorship.
Oreck claimed that Whirlpool's action came at the "behest
and insistence" of Sears9 5 and that the agreement between Sears
and Whirlpool constituted a group boycott subject to a per se rule.96
The trial court accepted this argument and instructed the jury ac-
cordingly, but the court of appeals reversed, ruling that the conduct
was to be analyzed under a rule of reason.97
Packard is also distinguishable as a case relying on the failing-firm doctrine. See
note 134 infra.
93 Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 1979).
94 Since 1925 Sears has been the principal distributor of Whirlpool
products, currently purchasing more than two-thirds of Whirlpool's total
appliance production and, at the time of the events here involved, more
than 90% of Whirlpool's vacuum cleaner output for resale under Sears'
"Kenmore" label. In addition Sears, beginning in 1925, purchased a sub-
stantial block of Whirlpool's common stock and by 1960 became its largest
single stockholder, owning 251,192 shares and usually electing one or more
of its executives to Whirlpool's board of directors.
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 135 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (Mansfield,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). See Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1968,
at 1, col. 1 (describing Whirlpool as a "captive company" of Sears).
95 579 F.2d at 128.
96 Id. 131. Oreck also alleged that Whirlpool and Sears were motivated by
price considerations. This argument, however, was raised only on appeal and was
therefore dismissed. Id. 130-31.
97 Id. 134. Judge Mansfield, joined by Judge Feinberg, issued a ringing dis-
sent. According to Judge Mansfield, if Sears and Whirlpool agreed to cut off sup-
plies to Oreck, the combination was "sufficiently pernicious in its purpose and effect
to be unreasonable, per se, and hence illegal." Id. 138 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
Secondly, although a manufacturer may act on its own to substitute one exclusive
distributor for another, when it "agrees with one or more existing competitors of its
distributor to cut off the distributor ... the resulting termination is unlawful." Id.
139 (citations omitted). Thirdly, Judge Mansfield distinguished Sylvania on the
ground that Oreck involved a boycott, not a vertical restriction. Id. 140.
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Essential to the Second Circuit's holding was its finding that
the challenged conduct was a vertical restraint and therefore to be
judged by a rule of reason, even though the termination may have
been directed by Sears.98 Three identifiable grounds premise the
court's finding. First, the court defined horizontal and vertical re-
strictions in terms of their form, rather than their purpose or
effect.99 Second, the court viewed the case as involving merely a
manufacturer's attempt to grant an exclusive distributorship.1 0
Third, the court held that a per se rule was inappropriate for ar-
rangements between one distributor and one dealer.101
The first and third grounds may be considered together. Both
reflect an assumption that a plurality of parties on the restrained
level of distribution is necessary in order to treat a vertical
arrangement as a horizontal restraint. This approach was cited with
approval by the Ninth Circuit in Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.102
There, upon somewhat analogous facts, the court ruled:
Such concert of action may suffice to create a conspiracy
but it cannot suffice to constitute such a concerted refusal
to deal as has so far been held to be per se unreasonable.
In all cases so far holding such restraints to be per se unrea-
sonable, there has been some horizontal concert of action
taken against the victims of the restraint.
1°3
In even starker terms, in H & B Equipment Co. v. International
Harvester Co.,10 4 the Fifth Circuit wrote, "[c]onspiracies between a
manufacturer and its distributors are only treated as horizontal,
however, when the source of the conspiracy is a combination of the
distributors." 105
As support for this proposition, the subscribing courts have
invariably cited 106 the Supreme Court's opinion in either United
98 579 F.2d at 131.
99 "It is important to distinguish between "horizontal' restraints, i.e. agreements
between competitors at the same level of market structure, and 'vertical' restraints,
i.e. combinations of persons at different levels of the market structure, such as manu-
facturers and distributors." Id. (citation omitted).
100 Id. 131-32 n.6.
101 Id.
102 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
103 Id. 387.
104 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
105 Id. 245 (citations omitted).
108 See Cough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 387 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131-
33 (2d Ci.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); H & B Equip. Co. v.
International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1978).
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States v. General Motors Corp.1 7 or Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc.08 In the former the Court found that an agreement
between General Motors and its distributors to refuse to deal with
discount sellers of new Chevrolets was illegal per se for two reasons.
The first was that a purpose of the boycott was to protect the favored
dealers from price competition by destroying the discounters. 1 9 The
other ground was the boycott itself, which the Court termed "a
classic conspiracy in restraint of trade: joint, collaborative action by
dealers, the appellee associations, and General Motors to eliminate
a class of competitors by terminating business dealings [with]
them." 110 Although a horizontal plurality did exist in General
Motors, the Court nowhere relied on that factor in finding the
conduct illegal.
Klor's furnishes even less support for a horizontal-plurality re-
quirement. There, the Court held per se illegal a boycott by a
large retailer, Broadway-Hale, and manufacturers of well-known
brands of appliances and audio-visual equipment. The combina-
tion, designed to eliminate a small retailer, Klor's, as a competitor
of Broadway-Hale, was condemned under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act."' The Court's concern was not competition on the
manufacturer level, where the plurality existed, but competition
on the dealer level, where no plurality existed.112 Klor's therefore
may not be read to support the proposition that a plurality of
parties on the restrained level is a prerequisite to applying hori-
zontal analysis to a vertical agreement. The Supreme Court did
not dearly address the horizontal-plurality requirement in either
General Motors or in Klor's.113
107384 U.S. 127 (1966).
108 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
109 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966).
11O Id. 140.
111 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-13 (1959).
Section 2 of the Sherman Ac% in pertinent part, provides: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
112 "This combination takes from Kior's its freedom to buy appliances in an
open competitive market and drives it out of business as a dealer in the defendants'
products." Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
See L. SuLL.iv, supra note 8, at 426 ("[I]n Kor's the Court insisted upon placing
in the foreground the horizontal characteristics and pointedly stated that the case was
not one 'of a single trader refusing to deal with another, nor even of a manufacturer
and dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship."') (quoting Klor's, 359 U.S. at
212).
113 See Elias, Dealer Termination or Exclusion; Intrabrand Competition and
GTE Sylvania, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 435, 460-61 (1977); Bohing, Franchise Termi-
nations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational Power, 53 T x. L. lRuv.
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The requirement may be attributable to an implicit assump-
tion that only when a dealer cartel is at work may the purpose of a
vertical restraint be presumed horizontal and on the dealer level. 1 4
Vertical analysis has traditionally been considered inappropriate
when a dealer cartel is involved." 5  Coincidentally, in relying on
the existence of such a cartel as an indication of horizontal purpose
and intended effect, that well-established approach appears to be
consistent with Cernuto.
This approach, however, necessarily assumes that vis-h-vis the
manufacturer, an individual distributor's bargaining power is.
typically so inconsequential that it cannot win a concession adverse
to the manufacturer's interest or one that would not have been
granted otherwise.""' This assumption may be unfounded. Ob-
servers have noted a decided shift during the past several decades
in bargaining power within distribution channels in favor of dis-
tributors. 117 A single dealer, acting alone, may be able to place
1180, 1213 (1975). For general discussions of Kior's, General Motors, and boy-
cotts, see R. BoRK, supra note 48, at 330; L. Su,.,vA, supra note 8, at 229-45;
Buxbaum, Boycotts and Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 671,
675-76 (1966); Horsley, Per Se Illegality and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 13
B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 484 (1972); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violatiorn
of the Antitrust Laws?, 27 RUTcms L. REv. 773 (1974).
114 Cf. H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 245
(5th Cir. 1978) (requiring a combination of distributors before conspiracy between
a manufacturer and its distributors is treated as a horizontal restraint). The court
cites Posner, supra note 85, at 17, which condemns dealer cartels, as support for
the proposition that a combination of distributors is necessary to treat a vertical
arrangement as a horizontal restraint. See Bohling, supra note 5, at 505: In
Sylvania "the Court stopped short of maintaining that in the absence of a hori-
zontal dealer cartel a nonprice vertical restriction on a dealer never has the effect
of restricting output. This conclusion . . . rests on the assumption that a dealer's
bargaining power vis a vis a manufacturer is extremely limited."
15 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28
(1977) ("There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions
from horizontal restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers. There is
no doubt that restrictions in the latter category would be illegal per se .... ");
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Cough v. Rossmoor Corp.,
585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); R. BoPx, supra
note 48, at 288; L. SuLLriAN, supra note 8, at 383; R. PosNa, supra note 7, at 151
n.24.
116 See Bohling, supra note 113, at 1181; Comment, Vertical Agreements to,
Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 HAAv. L.
REv. 1160, 1165 (1979).
117 See R. HoLLowAY & R. HANcoCK, MAIMsTWG IN A CHANcING ENVIRON-
MENT 399 (1973); McCammon & Bates, supra note 79, at 287; McVey, supra note
72, at 65; Strasser, supra note 74, at 789; Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution
Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARv. L. BEv. 795, 805-07 (1962). But see Comment,
Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck Corp. v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 92 HARv. L. REv. 1160, 1169 (1979) (concluding that manufacturers'
bargaining power is generally superior to that of distributors).
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.enough pressure upon a supplier to win concessions beneficial pri-
marily to the dealer's own interests. 1 8 Enforcement of the antitrust
laws would be seriously undermined if, by excessive reliance on what
may only be an indication of purpose, powerful retailers were al-
lowed to escape penalties incurred by weak retailers that must
join with others to achieve a similar goal. Moreover, under this
rule, a dealer cartel might escape the law's net by channeling its
demands through one small dealer.
Nor is the horizontal-plurality requirement justifiable as a
means of preferring vertical analysis and the rule of reason to per se
-rules: 119 avoidance of the law is no justification at all. At any rate,
horizontal plurality is not the real determinant of per se unreason-
ableness. 20 The essence of a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act is agreement to pursue illegal conduct.' 2 ' A combination to cut
a retailer off from a source of supply is not any less an illegal agree-
ment because only one, rather than a plurality, of the parties is on
the affected level. 22  Nor is the effect of the combination any less
harmful. A dealer's success in using the refusal-to-deal weapon to
118 See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959);
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 946 (1978); Copperstone v. Griswold Sporting Goods Co., [1977-2] Trade
Cas. 161,623 (E.D. Mich, 1977).
"9 Cf. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 132 n.6 (2d Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 946 (1978) (per se rule inappropriate for arrange-
ments between one distributor and one manufacturer).
120 Even combinations involving horizontal action may not be treated as per
se illegal. Rather, as in a group boycott, intent is the determinative criterion. If
the boycott's purpose is anticompetitive, exclusionary, or coercive, a per se rule
may be warranted. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[Tlhe hallmark of the 'group boycott' is the effort of com-
petitors to 'barricade themselves from competition at their own level.' It is this
purpose to exclude competition that has characterized the Supreme Court's decisions
invoking the group boycott per se rule.") (quoting L. SULr.vAN, supra note 8, at
2A5) (footnotes omitted); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973)
(applying rule of reason to boycotts); L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 8, at 241; Woolley,
-supra note 113, at 775.
In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970), a terminated distributor sought
application of a per se theory against two former suppliers on the ground that their
action in replacing it with another distributor constituted a group boycott. The
-court refused to hold the arrangement per se illegal because neither the new dis-
tributor nor any of the suppliers were "primarily motivated by a desire to damage
plaintiff or put it out of business." Id. 78. Per se illegality, though reserved
almost exclusively for horizontal restraints, thus turns not on form but on purpose.
121 See Turner, supra note 43, at 655-56.
122 Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 878 (1st Cir.
1966) (vertical agreement within scope of section 1 of Sherman Act); Girardi v.
Cates Rubber Co., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963) (finding that combination between
one manufacturer and one distributor might be illegal).
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strike at a competitor depends on enlisting the cooperation of their
mutual supplier, not other competing dealers.
12
Perhaps the clearest and most serious conflict between Cernuto
and Oreck is to be found in the Second Circuit's second ground-
justification of vertical analysis by labeling the challenged conduct
an attempt to establish an exclusive distributorship.124 The right of
a manufacturer to establish an exclusive distributorship is unques-
tioned.1m Courts have advised disgruntled terminated dealers that
an exclusive distributorship is simply not an antitrust violation, even
if the dealer's business may thereby have been severely damaged or
destroyed. 26 Nevertheless, Oreck has taken this doctrine beyond
its established reach. There, the exclusive-distributorship paradigm
was applied to a case in which exclusivity was achieved by terminat-
ing the sole competitor of the benefitted and instigating dealer.
12T
This is a rare and possibly unsound approach. In the vast majority
of cases, courts have approved exclusive distributorships only when
a manufacturer replaced an existing distributor with one that had
not previously been a competitor in that market or product line.1
28
123 See L. Sur.avAN, supra note 8, at 260; Buxbaum, supra note 113, at 675,
677.
1
2 4 Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967),
overruled on other grounds, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977); Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954, 961 n.3 (5th Cir.
1978); GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 988 (9th Cir.
1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d
1245, 1249 (5th Cir. 1975); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
126 E.g., Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir.
1975).
127 See text accompanying note 94 supra.
128 See, e.g., Universal Brands, Inc. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 546 F.2d 30 (5th
Cir. 1977) (substitution of exclusive distributor); Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec
Corp., 515 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1975) (substitution); Ark Dental Supply Co. v.
Cavitron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972) (substitution of distributors); Bushie
v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972) (vertical integration by manufac-
turer); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) (substitution of distributors);
Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 922 (1963) (substitution of distributors); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 227 n.l1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (substitution of dis-
tributors); Bay City-Abrahams Bros. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1206
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (terminated dealer not competing with substituted dealer in
relevant product line). Cf. Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d
466 (8th Cir. 1976) (dealer veto power over new distribution); Top-All Varieties,
Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (manufacturer
abiding by exclusive-distributorship agreement). But see Packard Motor Car Co.
v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822
(1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md,),
aft'd, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
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This distinction is important. An exclusive distributorship, a
promise by the supplier not to sell to any dealer other than the
exclusive dealer in a designated territory, is in effect a vertical ter-
ritorial restriction on intrabrand competition.129  From the manu-
facturer's viewpoint, an exclusive distributorship, like other vertical
restraints, may enable it to induce a dealer to take on its product
line, promote it vigorously, and provide customer services. 130
From the dealer's vantage point, an exclusive distributorship is an
effective means of escaping competition from other dealers.13'
In a typical exclusive-distributorship case, existing dealers are
replaced by a new dealer, with which the terminated dealers have
never competed for customers. But they are in competition for the
manufacturer's business: dealers trying to win an exclusive dis-
tributorship attempt to deprive others of that privilege by offering
the best terms. 32  Both intent and effect are procompetitive. Re-
placing one distributor with another does not reduce existing intra-
brand competition, 33 and a rational manufacturer will choose the
best offer. By making its distribution system more efficient, the
manufacturer stimulates interbrand competition. Furthermore,
because the manufacturer is not dependent upon the new distributor
at the time of negotiations, the possibility of dealer coercion is
remote. Vertical analysis is therefore appropriate for such typical
exclusive-distributorship practices.
The situation is different when the terminated distributor was
a competitor of the newly established exclusive distributor. 34 First,
129 See L. SuLmrAv, supra note 8, at 423-24.
130 Id. 424; See Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman
Act, 75 HAnv. L. Buy. 795, 805 (1962).
131 "Since the immediate object of an exclusive dealership is to protect the
dealer from competition in the manufacturer's product, it is likely to be the dealer
who asks for it." Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418,
421 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). See L. SumIvsr, supra note
8, at 425; Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75
HAsv. L. lEv. 795, 809 (1962).
' 32 See Woolley, supra note 113, at 796-97; Note, Restricted Channels of Dis-
tribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HAR. L.REv. 795, 806-08 (1962) (contractual
obligations demanded by manufacturer in return for exclusive distributorship); cf.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 78 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) (when previously exclusive dis-
tributor was replaced by a new distributor, the court looked upon plaintiff's past
performance, the supplier's purpose in improving his product's distribution, and the
new dealer's aggressiveness as the "essence of competition").
133 See Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); L. SuLrvAx, supra note 8, at 427; Elias, supra
note 113, at 473 n.112.
134 The Second Circuit admitted that "this case does not fit exactly into the
lealer substitution line of cases." Id. 132 n.6.
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with one less active distributor, intrabrand competition is reduced.
Second, and more important, as Professor Sullivan notes, "when an
existing dealer enlists the manufacturer to choke off one of the
dealer's competitors, although the 'agreement' which enables Sec-
tion 1 to be invoked is vertical, the restraint thereby achieved is
horizontal in its impact; it is an attack by one dealer against
another." 135 In either case, of course, the terminated dealer is
injured. Significant, however, is the absence in the latter case of the
type of procompetitive purpose 136 that may lead to enhanced inter-
brand competition and justify vertical analysis. In this absence,
horizontal analysis is proper.137
Application of a rule of reason to the facts of Oreck is thus
not justifiable by either a horizontal-plurality requirement or by the
exclusive distributorship cases: the Third Circuit's approach in
Cernuto is preferable.
V. APPLYING Cernuto: DISTINGUISHING HORIZONTAL FROM
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Cernuto was decided on a motion for summary judgment,
38
Furthermore, the major case supporting the Second Circuit's approach, Packard
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 822 (1957), is distinguishable. There, the largest dealer of Packard cars
in Baltimore told Packard that it was losing money and threatened to quit unless it
was granted an exclusive distributorship. Packard complied and terminated plain-
tiffs distributorship, a step which the court held per se legal. The result in Packard
can be explained not only in terms of exclusive distributorships, but also by the
"failing company" doctrine, a defense originating in merger cases that provides for
a degree of judicial discretion in enforcing the antitrust laws. See L. ScHwARTz &
J. FLYNN, supra note 6, at 172; L. SurLrivA, supra note 8, at § 204(g). For ex-
amples of characterizations of Packard as a "failing company" case, see White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 269-70 n.8 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 1979).
13 5 L. SuLtmavAN, supra note 8, at 429.
13 6 The court in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp. did not rule on the possibility
of an inquiry into anticompetitive purpose or effect, 579 F.2d 126, 132 n.6 (2d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). But by the court's reasoning
this inquiry would be undertaken within the framework of vertical analysis and
could produce the distorting results discussed in text accompanying notes 88-89
supra.
137 See text accompanying notes 83-90 supra.
13'Permitting a vertical arrangement to be analyzed primarily in terms of its
horizontal impact and purpose will probably improve a plaintifFs chances of sur-
viving summary judgment, if only for the reason that a per se rule is more easily
applied to horizontal restraints. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977) (horizontal restraints remain subject to per se rule);
Elias, supra note 113, at 443; Comment, A Proposed Rule of Reason Analysis for
Restrictions on Distribution, 47 FoRDHAm L. Rzv. 527, 536 (1979). Characterizing
vertical arrangements as horizontal restraints does not, however, mandate that
every case go to trial. The discovery process and pretrial record may permit a trial
judge to dispose of meritless claims notwithstanding an operative per se rule. See
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.and the court thus assumed 18 9 (1) that an agreement existed be-
tween the defendants, (2) that Famous's conduct was the cause of
United's decision to terminate Cernuto, and (3) that Famous acted
with the purpose of avoiding the threat of direct price competition
from Cernuto.140 This Comment has up to this point made a sim-
ilar assumption: that a dealer-prescribed vertical restraint can be
readily differentiated from a unilateral decision by a manufacturer.
Without these assumptions, guidelines must be formulated to fa-
cilitate the factfinder's task of distinguishing truly vertical re-
straints from those tainted by horizontal purpose.
The test in Cernuto was expressed in terms of causation-did
Famous bring about Cernuto's termination? 141 The practical prob-
lem is to formulate a jury instruction that specifically describes the
degree of causation necessary for a violation. Such an instruction
should also describe a standard by which businessmen can govern
their actions.
A recent district court opinion provides a good starting point.
In Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 142 Sweeney, a gaso-
Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1979); Lupia v.
Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[Mlere recitation
of antitrust claims in a complaint does not render that complaint immune from
summary disposition, if uncontradicted facts show otherwise.").
Even so, courts faced with cases similar to Cernuto should err if at all in
favor of a trial. The facts necessary to a terminated dealer's theory are eminently
well-suited to resolution by a jury: "[Tihere is one task that judges and juries,
informed through the adversary system, may really be good at. It is identifying the
pernicious in human affairs." L. ScHWABRFZ & I. FLYiN, supra note 6, at 125
(quoting unedited draft of Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines:
What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. BEv. 1214 (1977)).
The crucial element is subjective: what was the source and purpose of the termina-
tion decision? As the Supreme Court has advised, in oft-quoted words:
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex
antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof
is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses
thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to
cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their
testimony can be appraised.
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted). But see 2 P. ArmDA & D. Tutaum, ANTITusT LAw
ff 316b, at 62 (1978), noting that "the often quoted general language of Poller is in
itself no barrier to summary judgment. [The Court only seemed to say that] complex
antitrust cases frequently involve material disputes of fact that should not be resolved
prematurely."
3.9 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court is required to view
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
14O Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 165 (3d Cir. 1979).
141 Id. 165 ("[Wle must infer that Famous' conduct was the cause of United's
decision to terminate Cernuto's supply . . . .").
142 [1979-2] Trade Cas. 7f 62,951 (E. D. Pa. 1979).
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line retailer, sought to apply Cernuto to its case. Sweeney brought
suit When Texaco, its supplier, increased the price of gasoline sold
to Sweeney and thus forced Sweeney to raise its price at the pumps.
Sweeney was a discounter that cut its costs and prices by offering
only an austere "gas-and-go" service at its stations. This policy
greatly increased its sales and led other branded Texaco retailers
to complain to Texaco of the resulting harm to their businesses.
Sweeney alleged that Texaco's price increase was in response to
these complaints and was an attempt to stablize resale prices at a
level acceptable to the complaining retailers. The only substantial
evidence offered by Sweeney to prove a conspiracy was that Texaco
had received complaints from Sweeney's competitors. 143 Texaco,
on the other hand, was able to advance legitimate reasons for its
actions. 44
After extensive discovery and trial, directed verdict was granted
for defendants. According to the judge, if Sweeney had proven a
combination or conspiracy, the conduct would have been a hori-
zontal restraint illegal per se under Cernuto.145 But the judge re-
fused to allow an inference of concerted action from the mere receipt
by Texaco of complaints from Sweeney's competitors:
The courts agree that where the communications show only
the manufacturer's knowledge they cannot serve as the
basis for an inference of a combination. Whereas if the
communications show knowledge plus an intent to act on
the complaint, they can.... It is only if he acts upon the
complaints, thereby becoming more than a passive re-
cipient, that he turns into a co-conspirator and violates the
antitrust laws.146
This Comment does not take issue with the judge's ruling that mere
receipt of complaints cannot suffice to establish a combination or
conspiracy. 147 To hold otherwise clearly would be inequitable. 148
143 1d. 79,418.
144Id. 79,419.
145 Id. 79,420.
146 Id. (citations omitted).
'
47 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. CX Processing Labs., Inc., 523 F.2d 668
(9th Cir. 1975); Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir.
1963); Carr Elec. Corp. v. Sony Corp. of America, 472 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Cal.
1979); Carbon Steel Prods. Corp. v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
148 "[T]o draw an inference of combination between the maker and the re-
cipient of a complaint from the mere receipt of a complaint would be somewhat
like holding that the subject of an attempted bribe is guilty of bribery." Edward J.
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More susceptible to criticism, however, is the judge's dictum
that if the supplier had merely acted upon the complaints, the con-
duct would thereby have been brought within the scope of section
1 and under Cernuto would constitute a horizontal restraint. The
judge's language-"acts upon the complaints"-is too vague, and
gives too little weight to the supplier's legitimate explanations for
his actions, to justify horizontal characterization. The dictum in
Sweeney misperceives the realities of the interaction of interests in
a distribution channel. The manufacturer's procompetitive goals
for his distribution channel are often achieved only by satisfying
the anticompetitive desires- of his distributors.1 49 A manufacturer
may have numerous legitimate reasons for terminating a dealer 50
that coincide with the illegitimate reasons of the distributor de-
manding termination of its competitor. For instance, violation of
a distribution contract may come to the manufacturer's attention
only through the complaint of another dealer that maintains a close
and jealous watch upon its rivals' activities.15' Yet, if the
Sweeney dictum is given its full force, a manufacturer's actions on
this complaint would meet the requisite concert of action under
section 1, and the restraint would be considered horizontal-even
though the manufacturer was only trying to maintain control over
its distribution channel.
The court in Cernuto had already assumed the existence of
concerted action before it undertook to characterize the agreement
as effecting a horizontal restraint. The opinion is not so much
concerned with the agreement to restrain as with the reasons under-
lying the restraint.152 Although application of Cernuto should
incorporate Sweeney's reasoning regarding the requirements of sec-
tion 1, a court should demand more before considering challenged
conduct horizontal. The test should be formulated with an eye
towards avoiding unduly impinging upon a manufacturer's ability
and discretion to make marketing decisions while also avoiding
eviscerating a dealer's cause of action.
Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. If 62,951, at 79,435 n.32
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
149See Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75
HtAuv. L. R-Ev. 795, 825 (1962).
150 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(enforcement of location restriction by termination).
15, Indeed, one of the manufacturer's most valuable sources of information
about the operation of its distribution channel is communications from its dealers.
See Comment, Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 1-Ixv. L. REv. 1160, 1169 (1979).
15 2 See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
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These goals can be achieved by implementing a "but for"
test .53 with the burden of persuasion on the manufacturer. The
challenged conduct would be characterized as horizontal only if
the manufacturer would not have pursued the action but for the
complaints or agitation of the competing dealer or dealers. A pre-
liminary finding, as required by Sweeney, that the manufacturer
acted upon the complaint would raise a presumption of concerted
action, which could be rebutted only by proof of a convincing and
legitimate reason to show that, under the circumstances, the termi-
nation was inevitable.154 This evidence might include explanations
such as the dealer's violation of a marketing agreement, protection
of product integrity, unsatisfactory dealer performance, instability
of the dealer's business, the dealer's dishonesty, shortage of supply,
or reorganization of the marketing system. 55
One business reason, in particular, should not be considered
legitimate. A manufacturer may find cutting off a distributor in
his interest in order to retain the business of the distributor demand-
ing the termination.158 Oreck represents a good example of this
situation: Whirlpool could not afford to lose the patronage of
Sears, which bought ninety percent of all Whirlpool-made vacuum
cleaners. 5 7 Allowing a manufacturer to claim as a legitimate rea-
son such loss minimization would serve to deliver manufacturers
wholesale into the arms of anticompetitive, powerful distributors. 58
'53 Courts have had occasion to apply a "but for" test in considering whether
legal injury resulted from antitrust law violations. E.g., Warriner Hermetics., Inc.
v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1086 (1972). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTmrusT LAw
f 343-347 (1978); 16N J. VoN KArL owsI, ANnrrUST LAws ANm TRADE REuu-
LAUONS § 115.02(1) (b) (Business Organizations Series 1978).
'14A distribution agreement will permit termination for reasons other than
cause, or even at the suppliers whim, but the supplier's rights under the contract
are not a defense to an antitrust violation. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1962); Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d
566, 575 n.17 (4th Cir. 1963); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711,
723 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969). Cf. Cernuto, Inc.
v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 1979) (sudden breach of a
recent contract was relevant evidence of the true purpose of the termination).
155 See VEnicA RESTmcnONS, supra note 6, at 56-57; Bobling, supra note 113,
at 1220.
16 See Mallen, supra note 67, at 124.
' 57 See note 94 supra.
158"[I]f the manufacturer drops the customer it regards as less valuable to
satisfy the one it regards as more valuable, it is acting with no different or better
sanction than that of any other seller which when threatened by a buyer (or a group
of buyers), drops a competitor of the buyer (or group)." L. SurLTAv.u, supra note
8, at 428.
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The absence of a legitimate business reason for a termination,
combined with proof that a competing distributor played a large
role in the decision, "renders reasonable the inference of anticom-
petitive motive or effect." 159 When the decision is not uni-
lateral, in view of the possible anticompetitive purpose or effect,
it is proper to demand from the manufacturer a convincing justi-
fication. 00  The rebuttable presumption and the requirement that
the business reason be convincing as well as legitimate are also
justified, if not required, by the possibility that a manufacturer's
file will be created or doctored in order to paint a picture of an
innocent and efficiency-minded management.16' Demanding any
less may well reduce Cernuto to only a topic for law review com-
mentary and induce frustrated courts to apply something closer to
a material-cause test fraught with the drawbacks of the Sweeney
dictum.
CONCLUSION
By reversing prior case law and holding vertical restraints
subject to a rule of reason, Sylvania validly incorporated the realities
of modern marketing into the antitrust laws. But Sylvania cannot
serve as a screen for dealer abuse of a manufacturer's marketing
powers. If courts are to avoid exalting form over substance, they
should question whether the arrangement at issue is truly a vertical
restraint within the contemplation of Sylvania-a restraint imposed
by the manufacturer on intrabrand competition for the purpose of
enhancing interbrand competition. Dealer-prescribed restraints
must be treated for what they are-horizontal restraints not miti-
gated by vertical form.
To discover the true nature of a restraint on intrabrand com-
petition, courts should inquire into the source and purpose of the
decision to restrain. A vertical arrangement may be characterized
as horizontal if the factfinder finds that (1) but for the dealer's pres-
sure on a manufacturer to eliminate the competition of another
dealer, the restraint would not have occurred; and (2) the manu-
facturer can assert no convincing legitimate business reason of its
own for the restraint.
159 Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 470 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
160 Cf. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75
Hnv. L. REv. 795, 808-09 (1962) (dealers' interests in exclusive distributorships,
though perhaps coinciding with those of suppliers, are usually anticompetitive).
1
6 1 See L. ScHwMnTz & J. FLYNN, supra note 6, at 632-40 (materials and notes
on professional ethics and antitrust counseling).
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